Margin Call in und aus China? (I)
China ist von erheblicher Bedeutung für die Weltwirtschaft. Umso schwerer wiegt, dass der Aufschwung im Land auf einer Schuldenpolitik nach westlichem Vorbild basiert, wie bei bto immer wieder thematisiert. Optimisten verweisen auf die höheren Wachstumsraten, Pessimisten auf ähnliche Fälle, in denen hohes Kreditwachstum letztlich umgeschlagen ist. Allen großen Krisen ginge diese Kreditexpansionen voraus. Warum sollte es diesmal also anders sein, gerade auch mit Blick auf eine demografische Entwicklung, die der japanischen rasch folgen dürfte?
Heute nun Symptome aus verschiedenen Quellen zusammengefasst. Es schaut ganz nach einem Margin Call aus, der in China stattfindet und der auf die Welt ausstrahlen könnte.
Zunächst HORSEMAN CAPITAL:
- “China has a managed exchange rate. The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) has had to step in to the exchange market to buy any USD coming into China. To buy the USD coming into China, the PBOC has had to create CNY for this purpose. Typically, to soak up these new CNY, the PBOC has issued CNY bonds, as well as having very high reserve requirements on the banks to control the supply of CNY.” – bto: Sonst wäre eine galoppierende Inflation die Folge.
- “The PBOC is like any other bank, and it needs to match assets with liabilities. On the asset side, by far its biggest assets are foreign reserves. On the liability side are domestic deposits. For many years, foreign reserves were much larger than deposits, but now the gap is shrinking rapidly as foreign currency assets fall.” – bto: weil sie US-Dollar verkaufen muss, statt sie zu kaufen, was auch der Chart zeigt:
Quelle: HORSEMAN CAPITAL
- “If Chinese foreign reserves continue to fall and the PBOC wants to maintain control of the exchange rate, they will need to face some difficult choices. First of all, it could raise interest rates to try and make the Yuan more attractive and reduce outflows. This however would be negative for growth, a priority of the Chinese Communist Party. The other option is to reduce the holdings of deposits at the PBOC. The large holdings of deposits at PBOC is driven by the very high reserve requirements of the Chinese banking system, and previous cuts in the reserve requirements have reduced deposits at least temporarily.” – bto: Letztlich ist es einfach: Führt die künstliche Schwächung der eigenen Währung zu einem positiven Impuls auf die Wirtschaft, führt eine künstliche Stärkung zu einem negativen Impuls.
- “(…) how high interest rates need to rise to stop a currency from falling is to look at how weak a currency has been over the last twelve months. You then compare this to the difference in 10 year bond rates, and the movement in the exchange rate over the last 12 months to get an idea of the interest rates increase needed to attract US dollars. The idea is that if a currency has been weak, but interest rates are relatively high, then you are being adequately compensated. Conversely, if the currency has been weak, and the interest rates are relatively low, then rates will need to rise. Currently, it suggests Chinese 10 year rates need to be 6.5% higher, to halt currency weakness.” – bto: Da wäre er, der Margin Call!
Quelle: HORSEMAN CAPITAL
- “Given the large increase in rates needed to slow Chinese Yuan devaluation, devaluation must start to look like the more likely move.” – bto: Etwas anderes können sich die Chinesen nicht leisten. Damit exportieren sie wiederum Deflation in die Welt und verstärken protektionistische Bewegungen.
Passend dazu die Meldung der FT, wonach die Chinesen die Goldimporte erschweren. Das tun sie, um einen weiteren Abfluss von US-Dollar aus dem Land zu verhindern und so den Abwertungsdruck zu mindern. “China has curbed gold imports in the wake of government attempts to clamp down on capital leaving the country, according to traders and bankers.”
→ HORSEMAN CAPITAL: “Is China Running Out Of Money?”, November 2016
